

## David Ricardo in the Age of Artificial Intelligence: The Relevance of Comparative Advantage in the 21st Century

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### ABSTRACT

David Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage has long been a cornerstone of international trade economics. However, the rise of the digital economy and artificial intelligence (AI) challenges the foundational assumptions of the Ricardian model. This article critically examines the contemporary relevance of Ricardo's theory by analyzing how digitalization, automation, and the dominance of digital platforms are reshaping the determinants of economic specialization. Through a theoretical review of recent literature, we argue that traditional comparative advantage, based on relative labor costs, is being replaced by new forms of advantage rooted in knowledge, innovation, and data control. We present theoretical reformulations and alternative models, such as dynamic comparative advantage and Porter's competitive advantage framework, to better understand the emerging global economic geography. We conclude that, while the principle of specialization remains relevant, the Ricardian model must be fundamentally rethought in a world shaped by artificial intelligence and global digital networks.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Background and Research Problem

Since its formulation in *On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* (1817), David Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage has been a cornerstone of classical economic thought on international trade. The central principle holds that even if a country holds an absolute advantage in the production of all goods, it can still benefit from international trade by specializing in those goods for which it holds a relative cost advantage. This notion laid the theoretical foundation for free trade policies and global economic integration throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.

However, structural transformations brought by the digital economy and, more recently, by artificial intelligence (AI), have cast doubt on the validity and applicability of Ricardian theory in the contemporary context. Accelerated automation, digital decentralization of production, platform dominance, and data concentration challenge the assumptions of labor-intensive production, constant returns to scale, and factor immobility that underpin the classical model.

Current patterns of international trade are increasingly shaped by intangible factors such as knowledge, innovation, and control over digital infrastructures, rather than by the relative endowments of traditional factors of production. These dynamics demand a critical reassessment of the classical foundations of international economics, particularly Ricardo's principle of comparative advantage.

### 1.2. Research Objectives

The central objective of this article is to assess the contemporary relevance of Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage in an economic environment shaped by digital transformation and artificial intelligence. Specifically, we seek to answer the following questions:

- How do digital and technological shifts—especially the rise of platform capitalism—challenge the foundational assumptions of Ricardian theory?
- Does artificial intelligence render comparative advantage obsolete, or does it merely redefine its determinants?
- What alternative or complementary theoretical approaches can better explain international trade in the 21st century?

### 1.3. Relevance of the Study

The question of what determines competitive advantage has gained renewed urgency in a global economy increasingly dominated by data, algorithms, and technological capabilities. As international trade shifts away from traditional labor and capital intensity, there is a growing need to rethink trade theory and its implications for economic policy, technological sovereignty, and global inequality.

In particular, the rise of platform capitalism—where a handful of digital platforms control market access, consumer data, and infrastructural power—poses a significant challenge to classical assumptions about trade. These platforms not only mediate economic exchanges but also act as new global gatekeepers, shaping the allocation of resources, attention, and innovation flows. Their ability to internalize entire value chains, capture network effects, and evade traditional regulation calls into question the continued explanatory power of models based on national specialization and relative labor productivity.

Understanding how these transformations alter the dynamics of comparative advantage is essential to updating international economic theory for the digital age.

### 1.4. Structure of the Article

The article is structured in five sections in addition to this introduction. Section two presents the theoretical background, covering the foundations of Ricardian theory and key historical critiques. Section three outlines the methodological approach. Section four delivers the core analytical discussion, examining the impact of digitalization and artificial intelligence on comparative advantage and global trade dynamics. Finally, section five summarizes the findings and proposes directions for future research.

## 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

### 2.1. The Ricardian Theory of Comparative Advantage

David Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage, first articulated in *On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* (1817), argues that international trade benefits all participating countries—even when one has an absolute advantage in producing all goods. According to the model, each country should specialize in producing the goods for which it has the lowest opportunity cost, thereby optimizing global resource allocation and maximizing overall welfare.

The original Ricardian model rests on several simplifying assumptions:

- Two countries and two goods: Trade is conceptualized as a bilateral exchange between two nations producing two different products.
- Labor as the sole production factor: Productivity differences are attributed solely to labor input, excluding capital or natural resources.
- Perfect labor mobility within countries, but none across borders: Workers can shift between sectors domestically but cannot migrate internationally.
- No transport costs or trade barriers: The model assumes frictionless trade without tariffs or logistics constraints.
- Constant returns to scale: Production costs do not vary with output levels; there are no economies of scale or externalities.

To illustrate the model, Ricardo uses a numerical example involving England and Portugal, and two goods: wine and cloth.

Country	Wine (labor hours)	Cloth (labor hours)
Portugal	80	90
England	120	100

Here, Portugal requires fewer labor hours to produce both goods, and therefore has an absolute advantage in the production of both wine and cloth.

However, the opportunity costs differ:

- In Portugal, the opportunity cost of producing 1 unit of wine is  $80/90 = 0.89$  units of cloth.
- In England, the opportunity cost of producing 1 unit of wine is  $120/100 = 1.2$  units of cloth.

Thus, although Portugal is more productive in both goods, it sacrifices less cloth to produce wine than England does. Conversely, England sacrifices less wine to produce cloth.

According to Ricardo, each country should specialize in the good for which it has the lower opportunity cost:

- Portugal should specialize in wine.
- England should specialize in cloth.

By specializing and engaging in trade, both countries can consume beyond their production possibilities frontiers, obtaining more of both goods than they could have achieved in autarky. This demonstrates the gains from trade that stem from comparative advantage.

Ricardo's example remains one of the most powerful and widely taught illustrations in economic thought. It underscores the counterintuitive insight that relative productivity—not absolute capability—drives trade specialization.

## 2.2. Historical Critiques of Ricardian Assumptions

Despite its enduring influence, the Ricardian model has been subject to sustained criticism for its unrealistic assumptions and limited applicability to modern trade dynamics. Key critiques include:

### 2.2.1. Oversimplified Assumptions

The model's reliance on a single production factor (labor) and its omission of capital, technology, and resource heterogeneity limit its explanatory power. The Heckscher–Ohlin model (1933) expanded on Ricardo by incorporating factor endowments, while Krugman (1979) introduced economies of scale and monopolistic competition, offering a more realistic depiction of global trade patterns.

### 2.2.2. Capital Mobility and Erosion of Static Advantage

One of the most pressing modern critiques concerns the mobility of capital. In a globalized economy, firms can relocate production facilities to lower-cost regions, undermining the notion of fixed comparative advantages. As Rodrik (2011) emphasizes, the global redistribution of capital often decouples trade patterns from domestic labor productivity.

### 2.2.3. Unequal Distribution of Gains from Trade

Ricardo's model assumes that gains from trade are equitably distributed within each country, but empirical evidence suggests otherwise. Piketty (2014) and others have shown that globalization often exacerbates internal income inequality, disproportionately benefiting capital owners and high-skilled workers while marginalizing others.

### 2.2.4. Technological Disruption and Automation

The model also fails to account for technological disruption. Automation and digitalization—especially AI—have restructured entire industries, rendering traditional forms of labor-based comparative advantage less relevant. As Autor et al. (2013) demonstrate, automation can displace workers and shrink the very sectors in which comparative advantages previously existed.

## 2.3. Globalization, Technological Change, and Shifting Trade Dynamics

The rise of global value chains, knowledge-based economies, and platform-driven business models has transformed the structure of international trade. Notable developments include:

- Global Value Chains (GVCs): Trade has shifted from the exchange of final goods to the cross-border fragmentation of production processes (Baldwin, 2016).
- Knowledge Economies: Intangible assets like intellectual property, software, and data have overtaken physical goods as primary trade commodities (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014).
- Platform Capitalism: Digital platforms mediate global commerce, concentrating market power in a few transnational firms (Zuboff, 2019).

These transformations point to a growing disconnect between classical trade theory and the realities of contemporary economic competition.

## 3. METHODOLOGY

This article adopts a qualitative and conceptual research design, grounded in a critical review of relevant literature in economics and technology. The goal is not to test a specific hypothesis empirically, but to analyze whether and how the classical Ricardian framework can be adapted—or must be replaced—to account for the structural transformations induced by digitalization and artificial intelligence (AI).

### 3.1. Research Approach

The analysis is based on the method of theoretical synthesis, combining classical economic models with contemporary literature on technological change, global trade, and innovation. The guiding assumption is that economic theory must evolve in tandem with the structural shifts of production, value creation, and trade dynamics.

This approach allows for:

- Identifying tensions between classical assumptions and new economic realities;
- Evaluating whether the comparative advantage framework still offers explanatory power;
- Proposing theoretical alternatives or extensions better suited to the digital economy.

### 3.2. Sources and Selection Criteria

The literature reviewed includes foundational economic theories (e.g., Ricardo, Krugman), critiques and extensions (e.g., Heckscher–Ohlin, Porter, Rodrik), and recent interdisciplinary contributions focusing on the impact of digital technologies (e.g., Brynjolfsson & McAfee, Acemoglu & Restrepo, Baldwin, Zuboff, Harari).

Sources were selected based on the following criteria:

- Relevance: Theoretical or empirical focus on trade, automation, AI, and economic transformation;
- Influence: High-impact academic publications, widely cited theoretical models, and major policy frameworks;
- Recency: Priority was given to works published in the last two decades, particularly those addressing AI and platform economies.

### 3.3. Limitations

The article does not include empirical data analysis or quantitative modeling, which may limit its applicability to specific country contexts. However, this limitation is offset by the breadth of theoretical engagement and the depth of conceptual synthesis, which are well suited to addressing the article's central research questions.

## 4. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

### 4.1. The Digital Economy and the Transformation of Specialization

The transition from an industrial to a digital economy has radically altered the foundations of comparative advantage. As Rifkin (2014) argues, the marginal cost of producing digital goods approaches zero, undermining the logic of specialization based on labor productivity or resource endowments. Intangible assets such as data, algorithms, and intellectual property have replaced physical goods as the primary drivers of value in international trade.

Digitalization allows firms to operate globally with minimal physical presence, reducing dependence on local labor markets or resource endowments. This challenges Ricardo's notion that trade patterns are rooted in natural or historical differences in productivity.

### 4.2. Artificial Intelligence as a New Factor of Production

AI fundamentally changes how productivity is generated and distributed. According to Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018), AI introduces both substitution effects (replacing routine labor) and complementarity effects (enhancing high-skilled labor), thereby reshaping the comparative landscape.

The automation of cognitive and manual tasks reduces the comparative advantage once enjoyed by countries with abundant low-cost labor. In contrast, nations that dominate AI development and deployment—such as the United States and China—accumulate systemic advantages based on technological leadership, rather than on relative costs of traditional production factors.

AI also generates increasing returns to scale. The more data a company or country has, the more efficient and competitive its AI systems become, reinforcing a winner-takes-all logic that departs sharply from the assumptions of constant returns in Ricardian theory.

### 4.3. Platform Economies and the Reconfiguration of Trade

The digital economy has introduced a new form of trade intermediation based on platforms. Firms like Amazon, Alibaba, Google, and Meta now operate as global infrastructural actors, managing commerce, logistics, payments, and data flows across borders. These platforms increasingly dictate access to markets, visibility of producers, and consumer preferences.

This model of platform-mediated globalization departs radically from the assumptions of Ricardian trade theory, which envisions autonomous national producers engaging in exchange based on comparative labor productivity. In contrast, platforms internalize large segments of the value chain and extract rents by controlling the conditions under which other actors can participate in trade. As a result, comparative advantage becomes less a function of national factor endowments and more a question of platform access, network dominance, and data ownership.

#### 4.3.1. Platform Capitalism as Market Infrastructure

Platform capitalism, as theorized by Srnicek (2016), refers to an economic model in which digital platforms operate as infrastructures for value capture, rather than traditional producers of goods. These platforms:

- Define trade rules through algorithms that determine visibility, pricing, and access;
- Accumulate market power via network effects, locking in users and suppliers;
- Centralize data flows to continuously improve their predictive and logistical capacities;
- Disintermediate producers and national economies, capturing margins across the entire value chain.

The power of platforms lies not in producing at lower cost, but in owning and governing the ecosystem within which production and consumption take place. This represents a profound structural shift: whereas Ricardo emphasized specialization based on relative production efficiencies, platform capitalism emphasizes control over attention, information, and distribution.

This model disrupts Ricardian assumptions in several ways:

- Perfect competition is replaced by winner-takes-all dynamics;
- National borders become increasingly irrelevant in determining who benefits from trade;
- Specialization no longer guarantees trade participation if platforms can exclude or devalue suppliers algorithmically.

In practice, this means that firms—and even entire countries—may lose relevance in global trade regardless of their productive capacity, if they lack platform visibility or control.

#### 4.3.2. Geopolitical Tensions and Digital Protectionism

The rise of platform-centric trade has also triggered geopolitical responses. Countries have begun erecting digital trade barriers not to protect labor or industry, but to shield data flows and platform dominance.

- The U.S.–China tech war (e.g., bans on Huawei, TikTok, chip export controls) reflects not labor competition but strategic rivalry over platform infrastructure and AI capacity.

- The European Union's Digital Markets Act and GDPR represent efforts to regain regulatory control over platforms and restore economic sovereignty.

These developments underscore the shift from comparative advantage to technological dependency. Rather than competing on costs, countries now compete on platform power, regulatory frameworks, and capacity to retain value from data.

#### 4.4. Labor Polarization and Global Inequality

One of the unintended consequences of automation and AI is the polarization of labor markets. As Autor et al. (2013) note, middle-skill jobs are disappearing, while demand increases for both high-skilled tech workers and low-wage service workers.

This polarization erodes the inclusive benefits of trade predicted by Ricardo. Countries with insufficient investment in education and innovation are unable to develop new comparative advantages, falling into what Rodrik (2016) calls a “new middle-income trap”—where neither low labor costs nor high-tech capacity offer a competitive edge.

Developing economies that once relied on textile manufacturing or call centers now face structural disadvantages as these sectors are automated or absorbed by global platforms. The result is a deepening of global inequalities, both between and within nations.

#### 4.5. Emerging Models of Comparative Advantage

In response to these transformations, several scholars have proposed revised frameworks:

- **Knowledge-Based Comparative Advantage:** Rodrik (2018) argues that specialization now depends on national capacities for innovation, intellectual property protection, and digital infrastructure—not on factor endowments.
- **Dynamic Comparative Advantage:** Krugman (1991), followed by Hausmann and Hidalgo (2011), suggests that comparative advantages are not static. Instead, they can be cultivated through strategic investment in education, R&D, and industrial policy.
- **Competitive Advantage Framework:** Porter (1990) introduced the idea that firm strategy, domestic demand, and supporting industries play a critical role in shaping national competitiveness, beyond traditional comparative logic.

These models better capture the mechanisms by which countries navigate the digital economy, emphasizing institutional capacity, technological leadership, and network effects as central determinants of success.

## 5. CONCLUSION

### 5.1. Summary of Key Findings

This article has examined the continuing relevance of David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage in the context of digital transformation and artificial intelligence (AI). It has shown that the foundational assumptions of Ricardian theory—such as labor-based productivity, constant returns to scale, and nation-based specialization—are increasingly out of step with the dynamics of the global digital economy.

Central to this disruption is the emergence of platform capitalism, a system in which a small number of transnational platforms mediate global trade, concentrate data, and dictate market access. Rather than being driven by relative production costs, trade is now conditioned by who controls digital infrastructures, user networks, and information flows.

This shift challenges the very logic of comparative advantage, since economic power no longer correlates with productive efficiency, but with ownership of platforms, algorithms, and ecosystems. As platforms displace states as the primary units of trade governance, traditional models of trade theory struggle to remain analytically relevant.

The global economy now exhibits characteristics—such as increasing returns, network effects, and concentration of technological power—that render the Ricardian framework insufficient as a guide for understanding trade and specialization in the 21st century.

### 5.2. Theoretical and Policy Implications

The Ricardian framework must be reimagined. It is no longer sufficient to describe trade in terms of cost-based specialization; modern trade is shaped by platform access, digital control, and infrastructural entanglement. Emerging frameworks—such as knowledge-based and dynamic comparative advantage—offer partial alternatives, but they too must be extended to account for non-state actors and network effects.

Policy implications are profound:

- States must invest not only in innovation, but also in platform sovereignty and data governance;
- Digital trade policy must address algorithmic opacity and market exclusion driven by platforms;
- New global trade institutions may be required to regulate platform monopolies and ensure fair access.

In short, comparative advantage has shifted from the factory floor to the platform layer.

### 5.3. Future Research Directions

This paper opens new avenues for inquiry into the nature of comparative advantage in a platform-dominated economy:

- Empirical analysis of platform-induced trade exclusion and dependency;
- Comparative studies of national strategies for platform development and regulation;
- New metrics to evaluate digital comparative advantage beyond traditional productivity indicators.



As the global economy continues to digitize, the analytical center of gravity must shift—from goods and services to algorithms and infrastructures, from national specialization to platform power. A new paradigm is needed—one that explains not just who produces, but who controls the means of connection.

As global trade continues to evolve, economic theory must keep pace. The challenge is not merely to revise existing models but to craft a new paradigm for a post-Ricardian world—one in which data, algorithms, and innovation are the primary currencies of global economic power.

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